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Abstract
This paper discusses the requirements that a suitable for-
malism for dependability modeling/evaluation should pos-
sess. We also discuss the outline of Arcade, an architectural
dependability formalism that we are developing.
1 Introduction
Now that computers and communication systems are
proliferating in all kinds of devices and home appliances,
high-dependability is not restricted to computers that are
being used in traditional “high dependability applications”
such as space and aircraft or (nuclear) power control sys-
tems. An important difference with these traditional sys-
tems, however, is that in modern embedded systems, high
dependability is a key concern, but that the costs to be made
to achieve it may not be high. Instead, high dependability
must be achieved as a “by product” of a sound design and
implementation trajectory, almost at no additional costs.
This poses several requirements on the modeling and anal-
ysis capabilities of a framework for dependability analysis.
In this paper we first discuss the requirements which, in
our opinion, a suitable dependability formalism should pos-
sess. We also advocate that none of the existing formalisms
we know complies with all requirements. Then we lay out
our plans for a new, formally well-rooted, and extensible
framework for dependability evaluation, that comes very
close to a design language: Arcade (for ARChitecturAl De-
pendability Evaluation). It has been designed so as to com-
bine the strengths of previous approaches and to avoid their
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shortcomings. Key features are its formal semantics, com-
positional modeling and analysis, as well as extensibility. In
addition, we define our framework in an architectural style,
i.e., we define a system model in terms of components or
entities that (directly) map to actual physical/logical sys-
tem components. In fact our framework, as we will see
in Section 6, is ultimately intended to be incorporated into
an architectural design language. Finally, we show through
a small distributed database example the main features of
Arcade.
2 Requirements on dependability formalisms
First, we summarize the requirements which, in our
opinion, any good dependability formalism should possess.
1. Low modeling effort. A dependability formalism
should be simple, easy and intuitive to use, thus en-
abling the dependability analyst to create a model with
a reasonable amount of effort. In this respect, graphical
models with clear constructs to model dependability
specific concerns have a clear advantage over lower-
level models (e.g., state-based), which are only man-
ageable for very small systems.
2. High expressivity. A dependability formalism should
be able to express all relevant concerns. Clearly, there
is a trade off between modeling effort and expressive-
ness: the more different and/or complex the aspects (or
features) a formalism can express, the more complex
the formalism becomes. An important requirement of
a dependability framework is, therefore, to be extensi-
ble, thus allowing for future additions of features.
3. Formal semantics. Another highly desirable require-
ment is that of an unambiguous semantics. Formal se-
mantics pin down the meaning of a dependability for-
malism in a precise and unambiguous way and form a
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rigorous basis for analysis and tool support: all peo-
ple involved (designers, implementors, tool develop-
ers) agree on the semantics, so that costly misunder-
standings and misinterpretations are avoided.
4. Compositionality. Compositionality (also called
modularity) is a key technique to break down the com-
plexity of large systems into smaller and manageable
pieces. We distinguish between compositional model-
ing and compositional analysis. Compositional model-
ing (4a) entails that a model can be created by compos-
ing smaller submodels. There are two important types
of composition: parallel composition, which combines
two or more components which are at the same level of
abstraction, and hierarchical composition, where one
component is internally realized as a combination of
subcomponents. Compositional analysis (4b) means
that a model can be analyzed by combining the results
of the analysis of the submodels. Compositional anal-
ysis is a key feature in combating analysis complexity.
5. Analysis methods and tool support. Tool support is
another important aspect. In fact, from an engineering
point of view, a formalism has little use if it has no
adequate tool support. Of course, in order to obtain
a correct tool implementation, the formalism needs to
have a clear semantics.
3 Existing formalisms
There exists a wide range of techniques and tools for re-
liability and availability analysis. One may classify these
techniques/tools into three broad categories: (1) general-
purpose (dependability) models, (2) dependability-specific
modeling tools, and (3) model-based (or architectural) de-
pendability modeling tools.
The first category encompasses general-purpose low-
level formalisms such as continuous-time Markov chains
(CTMC), stochastic Petri nets (SPN) [3] and their ex-
tensions such as stochastic activity networks (SAN) [14],
stochastic process algebras (SPA) [10, 11], and input/output
interactive Markov chains (I/O-IMC) [6]. In general, these
formalisms, specify a system model in terms of states and
transitions. This makes them very general (and hence ex-
pressive) and precise. However, these models are typi-
cally large and less structured, hence difficult to understand,
since they do not provide any dependability-specific con-
structs. Some formalisms allow compositional modeling
(I/O-IMCs, SPAs, SANs) by a parallel composition operator
“‖” and/or compositional analysis (I/O-IMCs and SANs),
whereas others do not (SPNs).
The second category consists of formalisms and tools
which are specifically geared towards analyzing depend-
ability. In this category, practical tools often define a
1 2 3 4 5
(a/b)
general-purpose
CTMCs - + + -/- +
I/O-IMCs - + + +/+ +
SAN - + + +/- +
SPAs - + + +/+ +
SPNs - + + -/- +
specific
DFTs + - + +/+ +
DRBDs + - - +/- -
model-based
AADL + + - +/- -
UML + + - +/- -
Arcade + + + +/+ +
Table 1. Comparison of dependability evalua-
tion formalisms.
high-level modeling language, such as (dynamic) fault
trees (FTs/DFTs) and (dynamic) reliability block diagrams
(RBDs/DRBDs). To carry out the analysis, a low-level
model (such as a Markov chain) is automatically derived
from the dependability-specific model. Surprisingly, the de-
pendability specific approaches are all somehow limited in
expressiveness; although each of them incorporates certain
dependability constructs, none of them includes them all.
Although we agree that it is impossible to include all possi-
ble features, we do think that a modeling approach should
be extensible, so as to be able to accommodate any, also
future, needs. In earlier work [7], we provided a compo-
sitional semantics, analysis methods and tool support for
DFTs. Even though a similar approach could be taken for
other dependability specific formalisms such as DRBDs,
thus relieving our concerns with respect to semantics and
compositionality, the lack of expressiveness remains an im-
portant issue with these formalisms.
The third category consists of model-based (at the sys-
tem architectural level) formalisms, such as AADL and its
error annex [2], and the UML profile for modeling quality of
service and fault tolerance characteristics and mechanisms
[12]. Architectural languages require limited modeling ef-
fort, since they annotate architectural models, which play
an important role throughout the design anyway. However,
these languages, as we know them, lack a formal semantics
and tool support for automatic dependability evaluation.
Table 1 summarizes this (partially subjective) com-
parison between the different existing dependability for-
malisms. The five columns refer to the five desirable prop-
erties identified in section 2.
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4 The Arcade approach
The aim of our recently started work on Arcade is to
unite the strength of existing formalisms, while avoiding
their weaknesses.
Key features of Arcade are its architectural approach, re-
ducing the modeling effort; its extensibility, ensuring high
expressivity; and its formal semantics in terms of I/O-IMCs,
which not only pins down the semantics in an unambiguous
way, but also enables compositional analysis via the com-
positional aggregation approach for I/O-IMCs [6]. Below,
we describe the Arcade approach and discuss, how it real-
izes the requirements on dependability formalisms that we
put forward earlier.
4.1 Arcade modeling approach
The basic idea behind Arcade is that it defines a system
as a set of interacting components, where each component
is provided with a set of operational/failure modes, time-to-
failure/repair distributions, and failure/repair dependencies.
We propose a predefined set of components along with an
extensible set of features (such as interactions, dependen-
cies, operational/failure modes, etc).
We have identified three main components with which
we can, in a modular fashion, construct a system model: (1)
a Basic Component (BC), (2) a Repair Unit (RU), and (3) a
Spare Management Unit (SMU). The underlying semantics
of each of these components are I/O-IMCs.
A basic component represents a physical/logical system
component that has a distinct operational and failure behav-
ior. A BC can have any number of operational modes (e.g.,
active vs. inactive, normal vs. degraded) and can fail either
due to an inherent failure (realized as a Markovian transi-
tion) or due to a destructive functional dependency.
The RU component handles the repair of one or many
BCs. Various repair policies (e.g., first-come-first-served,
priority) and repair dependencies between BCs can be im-
plemented. Finally, the SMU handles the activation and de-
activation of BCs used as spare components.
4.2 Requirement fulfillment
We advocate that the Arcade approach meets the require-
ments set out in Section 2, as follows.
1. Low modeling effort. The Arcade approach requires
low modeling effort since its design has been centered
around three principles:
a. Architectural approach. Dependability analysis is
best done at an architectural level and, more specifi-
cally, by annotating existing architectural design mod-
els with dependability-specific information. This not
only relieves the engineer from the burden of creat-
ing new models for the purpose of dependability anal-
ysis, but also provides a single model, and thus ensures
integrity, for doing dependability and other design-
related evaluation methodologies.
b. Standard constructs. Arcade includes standard con-
structs for recurring dependability features. In particu-
lar, we provide standard operational/failure modes and
behavior, standard repair policies such as dedicated
and first-come-first-serve policies, and standard spare
management units.
c. Connect to standard formalisms. We plan to provide
a tight connection of Arcade to existing, graphical for-
malism such as UML and AADL. In fact, our frame-
work is ultimately intended to be incorporated into an
architectural design language.
2. High expressivity. To balance between expressivity
and modeling effort, Arcade is extensible. We provide
standard features whenever possible, and allow user-defined
features whenever needed. In fact, Arcade provides a stan-
dard set of basic components, but also allows the user to
define components that, for instance, can exhibit more com-
plex operational/failure modes.
3. Formal Semantics. We provide a formal semantics of
Arcade models in terms of I/O-IMCs: each Arcade com-
ponent is translated into an I/O-IMC. The semantics of the
entire Arcade system model is then obtained by composing
in parallel (using the parallel operator “‖”) the I/O-IMCs of
all components.
4. Compositional modeling and analysis. The Arcade
modeling language incorporates both parallel and hierar-
chical composition. The parallel composition of Arcade
components is realized by simply specifying multiple com-
ponents, saying how one component depends on the op-
erational/failure modes of other components. Hierarchical
composition will be realized through interfaces, specifying
how the failures of the internal components manifest them-
selves as failures of the composite component.
On the analysis side, we use the powerful composi-
tional aggregation methods for I/O-IMCs [6]. The I/O-IMC
formalism is equipped with several aggressive aggregation
(also called lumping or bisimulation minimization) tech-
niques, which replace an I/O-IMC with an equivalent, but
smaller I/O-IMC. An important feature is that aggregation
is compositional, i.e., first aggregating and then composing
is equivalent to first composing and then aggregating. This
property is exploited in the compositional aggregation tech-
nique (explained below) that obtains the global state space
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Figure 1. Arcade tool chain.
of a multiple component system through repeated compo-
sition/aggregation. The state space obtained in this way is
significantly smaller than the state space obtained by com-
posing all I/O-IMC models at once. Thus, compositional
aggregation is a key to combat the state space explosion
problem.
5. Analysis methods and tool support. We are working
on an Arcade analysis tool chain based on the CADP toolset
[8], which is a tool for (among others) I/O-IMC analysis
and includes methods for I/O-IMC composition, aggrega-
tion and analysis. Our tool chain, depicted in Figure 1, takes
as input an Arcade model and generates the underlying I/O-
IMC models in a format that is readable by CADP.
The tool chain we envisage works as follows. We start
with an Arcade system specification, parse all components
and store them in an internal XML format. Each com-
ponent (in XML format) is translated into its correspond-
ing I/O-IMC, represented in the input format of the CADP
tool. From the components’ I/O-IMCs, the I/O-IMC of the
overall system is obtained through compositional aggrega-
tion [6]:
a. Choose two I/O-IMCs, and compose them in parallel.
b. Minimize the thus obtained I/O-IMC.
c. Repeat the previous steps, until a single I/O-IMC (rep-
resenting the overall system) is obtained.
The compositional aggregation method is carried out within
CADP. In particular, we use CADP’s parallel composition
and its minimization algorithm to carry out the steps men-
tioned above. The order in which the I/O-IMCs are to be
composed is given by a (user-defined) composition script.
Finally, we transform the I/O-IMC into a continuous-time
Markov chain (CTMC) and apply standard techniques (im-
plemented in CADP) to compute dependability measures of
interest.
Currently, only textual input is supported (see example
in the next section), but we plan to develop a graphical lan-
guage for Arcade models. Also at the moment, Arcade
models are translated into CADP format directly. How-
ever, we plan to use an intermediate format based on XML
for storing Arcade models, facilitating the integration with
other tools, since many GUIs and other tools are able to
generate XML. Moreover, our future plans include a con-
nection of Arcade with UML and AADL.
5 Case study
To demonstrate the feasibility and usability of our ap-
proach, we chose a wide-spread case study from the litera-
ture, a distributed database system [14]. As a modeling for-
malism in [14], stochastic activity networks (SANs) were
employed.
We briefly describe the system functionality and show
parts of its Arcade specification.
5.1 Distributed database system
5.1.1 System description
The system possesses two processors, one of which is a
spare. Four disk controllers are divided into two sets. The
system has in total 24 hard disks, which are divided in 6
clusters, i.e., each cluster consisting of four disks. Each
controller is responsible for three disk clusters. Each of the
twelve disks the controller set is responsible for, is accessi-
ble by any of the two controllers in the respective set. Each
processor can access each of the four disk controllers.
The processors are administrated by a spare management
unit and share one repair unit. For each disk controller set
and disk cluster there is a repair unit responsible. All repair
units choose the next item to be repaired according to a first-
come first-served (FCFS) repair strategy.
The system is down, if one of the following conditions
is met: (1) all processors are down, or (2) in at least one
controller set, no controller is operational, or (3) more than
one disk in each cluster is down.
5.1.2 Arcade model
The Arcade models for the components of the distributed
database system are fairly simple. Most components have a
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unique operational mode, except the spare processor which
has two modes (i.e., inactive and active). Below, we de-
scribe the system in a textual format. The syntax should be
self-explanatory.
1. Arcade model of processor: Here, we have two Arcade
models, one for the primary processor, and one for the
spare processor:
(a) Primary processor
COMPONENT: pp
TIME-TO-FAILURE: exp( 12000 )
TIME-TO-REPAIR: exp(1)
The disk controllers (dc i, i = 1, · · · , 4) and the
disks (dj, j = 1, · · · , 24) have the same Arcade
model, except for a different time-to-failure in
case of the disks, which is exp( 16000 ).
(b) Spare processor:
COMPONENT: ps
OPERATIONAL MODES: (INACTIVE, ACTIVE)
TIME-TO-FAILURE: exp( 12000 ), exp(
1
2000 )
TIME-TO-REPAIR: exp(1)
2. Arcade model of processor repair unit: The repair unit
for processors is responsible for both the primary and
the spare processors. A simple FCFS repair strategy is
assumed:
REPAIR UNIT: p.rep
COMPONENTS: pp, ps
REPAIR STRATEGY: FCFS
3. The evaluation criteria formalizes the conditions under
which the system is down, in terms of a Boolean ex-
pression (Fault tree). The single failure conditions are
expressed in terms of the relevant1 failure modes of the
respective components.
SYSTEM DOWN:
(pp.down ∧ ps.down)
∨(dc 1.down ∧ dc 2.down)
∨(dc 3.down ∧ dc 4.down)
∨(2of4 d 1.down, ..., d 4.down)
∨... ∨ (2of4 d 21.down, ..., d 24.down)
(2of4 d 1.down, ..., d 4.down) denotes the failure of
2 out of the four disks d 1, d 2, d 3, and d 4.
1A component can have several failure modes of which not all need to
be relevant for the overall system evaluation.
5.2 Analysis
Using the tool chain described in Section 4.2.5, we gen-
erated the CTMC representing the behavior of the dis-
tributed database architecture system. This CTMC has
2,100 states and 15,120 transitions. During the genera-
tion of the final model the largest I/O-IMC encountered had
6,522 states and 33,486 transitions. For comparison, the fi-
nal model generated in [14] had 16,695 states.
Using the system CTMC we can analyze the availabil-
ity and reliability of the system. Table 2 shows the results
of this analysis compared to the SAN-based results in [14].
Note that the reliability results in this table are based on the
definition of reliability used in [14], i.e., the probability of
having no system failures within a certain mission time, as-
suming that no component is ever repaired. Because of the
discrepancy in reliability results we have also analyzed the
reliability of the distributed database system with the DFT
tool Galileo [1], which yields the same result as Arcade.2
Measure Arcade SAN [14] Galileo
A 0.999997 0.999997 -
R(5 weeks) 0.402018 0.425082 0.402018
Table 2. Dependability analysis for dis-
tributed database system
6 Comparing Arcade and AADL
AADL and its error annex offer means for specifying and
evaluating system dependability [2]. Each AADL compo-
nent model is equipped with an error model as defined in
the error annex. Since Arcade is very close to an architec-
tural design language, one could also use the Arcade mod-
els to describe the dependability aspects of AADL compo-
nents’ failure/operational behavior. In our opinion, the latter
choice has the following advantages.
1. The error annex of AADL provides only fairly low-
level means to specify the failure behavior of a given
system model: each error model consists of (1) an er-
ror model type, containing the number of states, the
actions or error events and occurrence rates of these
error events, and (2) an model implementation, which
consists of the definition of a state transition system.
Since the user has to specify a component’s complete
error behavior in terms of states and transitions, we
consider (especially when compared to the relatively
2It is possible to use DFTs here because we do not consider repair.
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abstract view in AADL of a system’s architecture) this
approach to be quite low-level and thus error-prone.
In contrast, Arcade provides a similarly abstract way
of specifying the failure and operational behavior of a
system.
2. The AADL error annex still lacks a fully formal se-
mantics. Although a first attempt in that direction has
been made in [13], we believe that it is questionable
whether the (partial) semantics presented in [13] is cor-
rect, since no clear rules expressing how to derive and
compose the GSPN from the error model are given.
In contrast, the Arcade approach defines a clear and
fully formal semantics [5]. The semantics of an Arcade
system is expressed in terms of the semantics of its
components, i.e., it is compositional. To generate the
overall dependability model the semantics of Arcade
provide sound operators (such as the parallel composi-
tion operator “||”).
3. The compositional approach of Arcade makes our de-
pendability framework readily extensible. For in-
stance, to introduce a new operational mode, only for
that new mode a small semantic model has to be modi-
fied or added in terms of I/O-IMCs. The interplay with
the existing modes is clearly defined via the semantics
of the composition operators. In AADL and its error
annex, it is unclear how this can be done, and how the
semantics of [13] could deal with that.
7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a new and extensible
framework for dependability evaluation: Arcade. Due to
its formal underlying model, it can be used composition-
ally, both for modeling and for analysis purposes. The latter
yields great computational advantages, as illustrated in the
case study. Next to that, the Arcade approach is extensible,
hence, adaptable to new circumstances or application areas.
Furthermore, we see Arcade as an important step towards
design languages for large and complex systems. Indeed,
the ultimate goal is to integrate Arcade in a design environ-
ment, e.g., based on AADL or UML.
It is important to note that although the syntax of the
Arcade language bears resemblance to SAVE [9], the ap-
proaches are truly different. Where in SAVE the actual
semantics of the models was hidden in software program
that coded the translation from that syntax to a large (flat)
Markov chain, Arcade has a formal semantical model that
allows for compositional evaluation, as well as facilitates
the extension of the modeling language.
As for the future, we plan to work on a further automa-
tion of the tool chain, as well as connect to design ap-
proaches based on AADL and UML. Furthermore, where
we now use relatively simple fault-tree like expressions to
specify system failure, we plan to allow for CSL-type ex-
pressions [4], thus facilitating stochastic model checking of
large dependability models.
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